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## THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY

### II.

It is perhaps indirectly due, in no small degree, to theoretical socialism that the historical view point has been so generally adopted in more recent national economy in Germany. When socialism announced its dictum that the realization of its plans and theories is an inevitable necessity in the course of natural historical development, its more or less positive opponents encountered the task of investigating the historical development of the industrial system, which served socialism as the premise from which to derive its bold conclusion. If it should be possible to meet socialism upon its chosen ground, to gain historical perspective unfavorable to socialism, the theory would thus be shaken from its foundation. Marx, and still more Engels, found in history a constantly increasing tendency to collectivism. If historical research should reach a contrary result, then an exceptional place will no longer be claimable for socialism. It will, in itself, have no more plausibility and scientific viability than other social impulses which have sprung from definite arbitrariness and not from historical necessity.

In the broad circuit of questions arising in this connection the phenomenon of the formation of social classes, so important for sociology, constitutes the central problem. How is it with the fact of social classes? History shows them from the beginning. Is the tendency with them toward stronger socialization and unification or toward divergence and differentiation? Inseparable from this consideration is the related phenomenon of the division of labor. It is a long way from primitive domestic economy to the modern industrial system with its industrial specialization and organization. Moreover, the division of labor in our day is constantly becoming more minute. Does it lead finally to socialization or to individualization? Socialism sees

in the separation of society into classes the strongest factor to produce ultimately complete collectivism. Class antagonisms must and will find their termination when there are no more antagonisms, that is, when society is no longer split into classes. Private property alone is it that separates society into reciprocally hostile classes. With the abolition of private property this antagonism will disappear. So it is also with the division of labor. The more occupations are specialized, the more fragmentary each one's work becomes, the more dependent is each individual upon another. This dependence tends obviously towards ultimate socialization—in the first place, of production. So at least reasons socialism.

Gustav Schmoller reached an opposite result in his monographs upon this subject.<sup>1</sup> By division of labor Schmoller understands "the permanent, individual, lifelong adjustment to a specialized vocation" (*Jahrb.* XIV, p. 47). He traces division of labor back to differences in men. It can consequently not be regarded as an historical category. Variation of social rank and possession, of honor and emolument, is really only a secondary phenomenon, a consequence of social differentiation, and it is developed according to natural laws. He recognizes in all only two grounds for division of labor: "the difference in personal qualities and the community of interest of the men in a given combination" (p. 53). Even a contrast as radical as that in our time between wage-earners and entrepreneurs has its roots, according to Schmoller, not in property but in hereditary typical qualities, the modification of which is of much greater importance for social reform than changes in the distribution of property" (p. 89). According to this view division of labor depends originally upon adaptation and then upon transmission of the qualities concerned. In the social order of today it is "neither absolutely harmonious nor absolutely anarchic, but rather a

<sup>1</sup> The following are notable in this connection: (1) "Das Wesen der Arbeitstheilung und der socialen Klassenbildung" (*Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, u. s. w.*, xiv. Jahrgang); (2) "Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Unternehmung" (*ibid.*); (3) "Ueber die Entwicklung des Grossbetriebes und die sociale Klassenbildung" (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, April 1892).

social system which has its basis in the unity of language, thought, and moral ideas; its support in the unity of customs, law, and the commercial organization" (p. 58).

In connection with division of labor the formation of social classes is both a consequence and a concomitant. This phenomenon is not to be traced primarily to differences in possessions, since this is an effect of a primary cause—the difference in power of adaptation. On the contrary, "the first accumulation of property and the incipient inequality of its distribution is to be ascribed only to division of labor, to the formation of classes, and to the superior productive capacity of certain persons and occupations (p. 86).

The formation of classes does not progress incessantly. Social classes are formed rather in certain epochs, of which Schmoller asserts that in them "differentiation predominates over integration" (p. 74). Further, according to Schmoller, these classes constituting groups on the basis of natural differences are in normal conditions not in conflict with each other. On the contrary, "the culture of society rests in morally and legally ordered conditions of peace, which have their roots in a psychical community. Social conflicts are disturbances of this community. They arise in case of sudden and powerful increase of differentiation, when the bonds of community are too weak, when legal and moral ordering of the newly originated division of labor and of possessions is either not yet established or has ceased to be effective" (p. 99). The struggle of oppressed classes against their oppressors does not break out, however, when the pressure is severest, "but precisely in periods of improvement in their condition it is the *aristocracy* among the oppressed who give the signal for war" (p. 101). We might express the gist of these conclusions of Schmoller in a proposition which occurs elsewhere: "The higher civilizations will necessarily produce a shifting variation of forms of employment, not a uniformity in the sense of mere state action or mere individual action" (*Preuss. Jahrbücher*, 1892, p. 471).

For all these conclusions Schmoller has practically omitted

proofs. It is, to be sure, doubtless true that the first impulse to human differentiation is given by the physical and psychical differences of men. That these differences, however, are so exactly and certainly transmitted from generation to generation that they produce the groupings according to class is by no means to be asserted without further evidence. The constant passages from class to class, ascents to a higher class, and falls into a lower one are too plain and frequent to be ignored. Gustav Freytag was nearer right than Schmoller in saying that "a piece of Darwinism finds expression when the sexton's son becomes a parson." No more is Schmoller's assertion to be accepted that the division of labor is to be traced *solely* to physical and psychical differences in individuals instead of being an eminently social category. So far as our social order of today is concerned it is surely false to assert that each individual fills the place which best corresponds with his abilities. The division of labor appears in Schmoller's representation, on the one hand, as a natural necessity, on the other as the voluntary act of the individual. In fact it is usually a *necessity socially imposed on the individual*.

Quite as unauthorized is the assertion of Schmoller that the promotion of classes is a consequence of division of labor alone. It is not superior industrial capacity of given persons and occupations that determines their inclusion in a higher class, but their superior social power. Doubtless Schmoller would not claim that social power (*Macht*) and industrial capacity (*Leistungsfähigkeit*) are identical concepts.

In spite of the insufficient basis and evidence for Schmoller's specific assertions, his fundamental thought that the industrial order tends not towards uniformity, but towards diversity, seems to me a very fruitful one for sociology and materially quite justified. We are reminded by it of the thought of Herbert Spencer, that specialization and differentiation are in direct ratio to each other. These two tendencies, particularly in modern society, assert themselves with equal energy, and no one is entitled to say which of them will be the victor. At all events

today's political policies show that the industrial order is breaking a path which is a compromise way between private economy and collective economy.

Symptomatic of this harmonization of the antitheses is nationalism in its modern type. If we regard individualism and socialism as the two component forces in the state, their resultant is nationalism. Nationalism satisfies both in so far as it presents on the one hand a unity of individual type, on the other hand a great social group. A like harmonization of the antitheses may be contained in the state socialism connoted in the above cited doctrine of Schmoller, and favored in Germany in a special manner also by Adolf Wagner.

With this criticism of Schmoller's propositions I have anticipated in many respects the position of Karl Bücher.<sup>1</sup> The latter takes a deeper and more comprehensive view of the problem. He is not satisfied with the ordinary conception of the division of labor. He distinguishes rather five types of division: (1) division of production (*Produktionsteilung*); (2) apportioning of labor (*Arbeitszerlegung*); (3) specialization; (4) separation into callings (*Berufsteilung*); and, finally, (5) displacement of labor (*Arbeitsverschiebung*). This fivefold division has this immediate advantage of avoiding the confusion that has arisen from Adam Smith's well-known illustration of needle manufacture. In that illustration we have primarily only the phenomena of apportioning labor ((2) above). These phenomena are, however, both for national economy and for sociology, much less essential than the division of production (1) with which it is usually confounded. Smith further traced division of labor to a basal psychic impulse in man—the impulse to exchange. Bücher on the contrary denies that such an impulse exists in primitive man. In low stages of culture indeed we encounter an unconquerable mistrust of all exchange. We might rather affirm that the impulse to exchange gets its origin under the influence of an

<sup>1</sup> *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft*. Sechs Vorträge. Tübingen, 1893. We have here to do with lectures I and III only. The former bears the title of the series; the latter is entitled *Arbeitsteilung und sociale Klassenbildung*.

industrial order which includes division of labor. "The division of labor which national economy considers is a historical category, not an elementary economic phenomenon" (p. 139).

Bücher directs his polemics against Schmoller also. The latter claims division of labor as the ground for variation in possessions, etc. Bücher declares: "So far as these occurrences (*i. e.*, the phenomena of division of labor) do not elude research in prehistoric obscurity, as in the case of the rise of the priest-hoods and of the most ancient orders of nobility, I am disposed to believe that we might invert Schmoller's remarkable dictum and declare that differences of possessions and of income are not the consequence of division of labor but its chief cause" (p. 152).

The assertion of Schmoller that the structure of classes rests entirely upon inheritance is characterized by Bücher as "a thesis without supporting evidence, and a crooked Darwinian analogy." At the same time Bücher admits that it may be as difficult to adduce evidence against the assertion as for it. Bücher distinguishes between vocational class (*Berufsklasse*) and vocational status (*Berufsstand*). Only of the former is it true that possessions and occupation define its limits. Bücher also admits that the inheritance hypothesis is admissible in case of the former but not in case of the latter.

Of special weight in Bücher's treatment is the further circumstance that he does not overlook the differences between industrial epochs. The relation of division of labor to possessions is quite different today from what it was in the Middle Ages, for instance. Schmoller—the head of the historical school!—planted himself on grounds of natural history, and let history drop out of sight! In opposition to this summary method of treatment, Bücher rightly emphasizes the difference between different periods. "During the Middle Ages," he says, "lack of capital compelled division of occupations (*Berufsteilung*); at present abundance of capital tends to minute subdivision of labor (*Arbeitszerlegung*) and to displacement of labor (*Arbeitsverschiebung*)" (p. 155). In this analysis Bücher's new terminology does very good service.

Finally, whether we decline or consent to accept the particular allegations and conclusions of these two thinkers, we certainly cannot fail to notice one serious omission in both forms of treatment. There is no profound perception of the individual or social psychological, that is, of the peculiarly sociological basis and setting of this significant social phenomenon. This remained for another thinker, a specialist in sociology, of whom I shall speak presently in connection with the systematic sociologists.

Meanwhile the first of Bücher's lectures, which gave the title to the collection, has no little interest in its bearing upon the historical mode of sociological investigation. It treats of the origin of national industry (*Volkswirtschaft*), and attempts to outline a universal scheme of its development. As criterion for characterization and designation of the different epochs in industrial history Bücher selects the objective circumstance, which is surely of vast importance for national economy, viz., the length of the course over which goods pass between the producer and the consumer. Accordingly, three epochs are distinguished; those, namely, of: (1) domestic industry (*Hauswirtschaft*), (2) municipal industry (*Stadtwirtschaft*), (3) national industry (*Volkswirtschaft*). The first extended until about a thousand years after Christ; the second survives even to our own day; the third is really a development of present times. "The elaboration of national industry is essentially a result of that political centralization which begins at the turning point of the Middle Ages with the rise of territorial state structures, and reaches its culmination today in the creation of states, realizing "national unity" (*des nationalen Einheitsstaates*) (p. 67).

The whole tendency of economic politics since the sixteenth century has been for satisfaction of the impulse toward integration of nationality. "In the latest phase of this development the principle of nationality has become an underlying motive of mighty consolidating force" (p. 75). Bücher experiences, therefore, neither the customary satisfaction, nor does he feel any alarm over the alleged present tendency to widen national



industry into world industry. According to him the development of industry runs the course from the home via the city to the state. Here, so far as we can see, it halts. In the first stadium blood relationship forms the basis; in the second, neighborhood; in the third, nationality. "The path which humanity has passed over is from community to society (*Gemeinschaft zur Gesellschaft*) and so far as we can see it ends with constantly closer socialization" (p. 77).

This is the undertone of the book—socialization is constantly becoming closer. At the highest grade of culture which the development of humanity has thus far reached social bonds are not loosened, but on the contrary they are drawn closer. And again, it is a sort of blood relationship which serves as basis and as impelling force for this socialization. We shall further see that another thinker, who first put this terminology "community" and "society" to the special uses just noticed, reached conclusions of quite dissimilar sort, something indeed like pessimism. At all events Ferdinand Tönnies pays too little, and perhaps no respect to "the mighty consolidating force of the principle of nationality."

### III.

While it is true of every science that the search after and the leaning toward analogies has resulted in little good, in sociology they have even—for who knows how long—barred the way to normal and regular development. With all due recognition and admiration for the monumental works of Herbert Spencer, he must yet be charged with obstructing the development of sociology by his insistence upon the analogy between society and an organism. In his own mind this analogy may have had merely the force of a means of interpretation, which served him, according to a perfectly valid methodology, as a leading string to guide from member to member until all could be comprehended as existing together in a comprehensive phenomenon, "society;" others, however, have been unable to observe proper bounds, and on the basis of analogies which they

took for definitions have arrived at wild conclusions and still wilder systems. One of our younger scholars, Paul Barth, has even gone so far as to cite this analogy as a scientific authority to refute Marx. His reply to Marx's claim that industry is the "foundation" upon which law rises as a superstructure is that this cannot be "because it is *incongruous with the only correct conception of society as an organism*" (p. 137). He declares that Spencer is authorized in regarding his principle—"society is an organism"—as a parallelism existing not in thought merely, but also in reality, and that he is entitled to draw from it conclusions about reality. However that may be, the organic analogy has been made the basis of a science, and thereby its evolution has been nipped in the bud. From the fruitless efforts of Comte to Paul von Lilienfeld enough discussion of this subject has been contained in sociological literature. I may here select only one of the most eminent German representatives of this theory in order to show from his works the unfruitfulness of this lame analogy. In his colossal work in four volumes Fr. Albert Schaeffle has attempted, from the view point that society is comparable with an organism, to understand society and to describe its life and development.\* I shall not inquire how far he has been led by Comte and Spencer. Schaeffle himself admits only a very slight measure of influence from them.

Schaeffle takes his departure from the conviction that the social "body" differs in degree, not in kind, from every other individual organism. He announces this frequently. Thus: "The psychical life of the social body is a higher potency of the psychical life of the individual. It would not be hard to show what there is added to this, in a given grade of social development, as peculiar social reinforcement,—language, symbols, institutions for communication of ideas, division and combination of psychical labor,—though it must be admitted that

\* *Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*. Encyklopädischer Versuch einer realen Anatomie, Physiologie und Psychologie der menschlicher Gesellschaft mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Volkswirtschaft als socialer Stoffwechsel. 4 Bände. Tübingen, 1875-78. (For a notice of the second edition, in two volumes, and a different estimate of SCHAEFFLE, *vide* AM. JOUR. OF SOCIOLOGY, September 1896, p. 310.)

comparatively little has been done towards making such exhibits" (p. 10). "In other respects also, which do not belong immediately to evolution and dissolution, the social body proves itself in its structure and life not essentially but only in degree different from the material systems and processes of organic and inorganic nature" (p. 19). "The psychophysical and the physical phenomena of the social life are to be sure incomparably more complex and evolved than those of individual life; they manifest nothing (*sic*), however, the germ of which does not appear in the life of individual men, or which is not in part suggested at least in lower animal life" (p. 703). And thus he proceeds with all sorts of variations.

Now, in my opinion, the truth is precisely the opposite of all this. If we contemplate society as a totality, or with Schaeffle as an organism, we have at least in view an organism of a wholly peculiar sort. We need not first make profound studies and penetrating observations in order to discover that a coherent mass of men, a society, is something different from a mere sum, or the product of its individuals. If society were only a higher potency of the individual organisms, or if, as Schaeffle expresses himself, "the differentiating and characterizing marks of the social body" were "merely the universality and high spiritualization of its components and of their movements" it would be a necessary consequence that the psychical energy of the mass must increase in proportion as the number of individuals increases. The first and strongest effect of mass association is, as a matter of fact, unquestionably a reduction of the level of psychical force, a grinding down to the measure of the average. This observation had been made even by Schiller, who in sociology accomplished if possible still less than Schaeffle. "Each individual," he says, "seems to me fairly wise and intelligent. Let them incorporate and the result is a block-head." The explanation is not far to seek. The universal, the generic, is in each. On the other hand, the special, the higher, the more spiritual belongs only to individuals. In the coexistence of the mass, this general, possessed by all, alone comes to

successful expression. "What is common to all can be only the possession of him who has the least," says Simmel.

Yet the important thing after all is rather that society whether we think of it in the broadest sense as humanity, or in a more restricted sense somewhat as a club, is something entirely different from the individual *per se*, and furthermore something *generically* different. Still more: for science the primary thing is not properly the individual that sometime enters into society, but rather society itself. The individual is only an abstraction. It is therefore an entire inversion to take as the point of departure of sociological investigation the *individual*, who, so far as we know him in history and life, is merely a member of a group—to use Simmel's phrase, "a point of intersection of social threads" (*Schnittpunkt sozialer Fäden*). Rather were it to be recommended that individual psychology take its departure from social psychology. And further; supposing the view were admissible that the social body is analogous in structure and life with the organism of the individual man; what addition would that bring to *positive* knowledge and understanding of this peculiar organism? None whatever, except mere, and at that almost always misleading, or at any rate irrelevant, designations of the particular members of society—designations taken bodily, without criticism, and only for sake of the sounding name, from anatomy, biology, etc. Thus Schaeffle busies himself with rebaptizing groups or members of the social body with names of members of the animal body. There are, he says, five "social tissues" corresponding to the organic tissues—(a) osseous, (b) tegumentary, (c) vascular, (d) muscular, (e) nervous. The social tissues are (1) locative, *i. e.*, settlements, roads and buildings (attaching the social body to the soil); (2) protective; (3) commercial (*i. e.*, devoted to exchange of materials, including "production" trade, etc.); (4) for administrative technique (civil and military); (5) for psychic guidance (planning, book-keeping, control, etc.).

Apart now from all errors of fact, I raise the one practical question: Of what good is all this? We certainly cannot carry

over to "psychic guidance," and "military and civil institutions" the same law which the physiologist may have discovered for the nervous tissue and muscular tissue. We have then nothing but an empty designation. We surely cannot lay serious claim to any scientific insight from having been taught that there are "devices for protection." Moreover, these hollow designations are, as remarked, actually misleading. To uncover only a single harmful aspect, they encourage the thought that the "social body" is born with all these "tissues," and that it can as little do without them or provide substitutes for them as a man can in the case of his muscles or his skin. This ready-made theory surely has no room for a thought of development.

Hand in hand with a favoring biology and physiology Schaeffle seeks further component parts of the social body, and, as might be expected, he is fortunate enough to find them. "We recognize," he says, "the social connecting tissue in the ideally mediated, legally unformed coherences." Such are blood relationship, stock, nationality, race, compatriotism, party, estate, confession, etc." (p. 288 *sq.*). We might have thought that all these represented separate and independent organisms. Schaeffle teaches us, however, that they are mere "connecting tissue." In another passage he says, however, "The family is for the social body what the cell is for the organic body" (p. 213). But the family rests on relationship. Hence it follows that the family is *a cell constructed from connecting tissue!*

But this is far from being the most absurd conclusion to which Schaeffle's premises and definitions lead. In the second volume of his work he inquires after the "law of development." He starts with the thought that mechanical causality does not suffice for explanation and comprehension of the progress of civilization; that *causæ finales* are rather to be assumed. The "goal-setting interworking of a divine world substance" must not be left out of account. In accordance with this presumption Schaeffle posits "adaptation" (*Anpassung*) as the moving force in social development, which, however "is assured and mediated by the struggle for existence." He formulates the law of social

development in these terms: "Progressive social formation is the highest result of the perfecting selections of the human struggle for existence" (p. 55 *sq.*). Schaeffle is here quite on Darwinian ground. He insists that society is advancing toward constantly improved adaptations, that the higher human types are constantly transmitted and extended, while the lower species are in course of extinction. In short, Schaeffle holds fast to belief in the intellectual and moral progress of the human race. He has not demonstrated it, as no belief can be demonstratively established.

Another incomparably profounder sociologist, Ferdinand Tönnies, disbelieves in this progress.<sup>1</sup> As a basis for his theory Tönnies constructs a new psychological terminology. He distinguishes between "essential will" (*Wesenwille*) and "arbitrariness" (*Wilkur*). "Essential will is the psychological equivalent of the human body, or the principle of unity of life, in so far as the same is contemplated under that form of reality to which the thinker himself belongs (*quatenus sub attributo cogitationis concipitur*)" (p. 99). "Arbitrariness" is a fabric of thought itself, to which, therefore, proper reality can be attributed only in relation to its originator, the agent of the thought, in case the arbitrariness becomes known to others and is recognized as such by them" (p. 100). In other words "essential will" is, on the one side, generic will, on the other side, instinctive will; arbitrariness is *individual*, and, so to speak, *willed will*. With the former men enter natural, with the latter artificial relationships. Natural relations and circumstances of men are called by Tönnies "community" (*Gemeinschaft*); artificial relationships he calls "society" (*Gesellschaft*). The former is divisible into three kinds: (1) blood relationship (*Verwandtschaft*); (2) neighborhood<sup>2</sup> (*Nachbarschaft*); (3) friendship.<sup>3</sup> In the case of each the following laws prevail: (1) Relatives and mates love

<sup>1</sup> *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. Abhandlung des Kommunismus und des Socialismus als empirischer Kulturformen. Leipzig, 1887.

<sup>2</sup> This form of the word is needed in sociology. Tr.

<sup>3</sup> Preference for Latin forms might dictate the alternative translation: 1. *Consanguinity*. 2. *Proximity*. 3. *Amity*. Tr.

each other or accustom themselves easily to each other; speak and think often and gladly to, with, and of each other. The same is true in different proportions of neighbors and other friends. (2) Between persons loving each other in these varying degrees there is common understanding. (3) Persons thus loving and understanding each other continue together and order their common life (p. 25). The first and most intimate type of community is the family, the last and most extreme the religious society.

While thus the community manifests a complete subjective coherence, a natural affinity (*Zusammengehörigkeit*), such element is entirely wanting in society. Here the bond is lax and external, and the individual "wills"—or more precisely "arbitrarinesses"—which are bound to and in it "remain independent of each other and without subjective influence upon each other." At the same time it is to be borne in mind that society is not to be regarded as an artificial product, as a combination formed for defined purposes, according to the *social contract* theory. Society is rather, like every other human work, a combination of natural and artificial elements, with the immanent tendency toward the preponderance and ultimate entire prevalence of the artificial. Today's society is derived from primitive society; that is, what was originally subjective has become "externalized," what was originally close and intimate has become loosened and alienated. Externally this transition appears to be the passage from universal domestic economy to universal commercial economy, and in the closest connection therewith from predominant agriculture to predominant "industry" (p. 63).

While now society shows "industry" as its external stamp, it appears at the same time that the "capitalist class" is the peculiar social agent, for in the tripartite process of industry—Tönnies here strictly follows the scheme of Marx—the proletarians, the laborers, are for the most part "unfree" and only "formally arbitrary" (*formal willkürlich*), while the capitalistic class acts in all respects as "free" and "materially arbitrary."

The state also, in so far as it exists for the protection of the property and the freedom of its subjects, is identical with society, and is accordingly a "capitalistic institution."

Our society, moreover, is approaching its dissolution along two paths; first, in economic relations, inasmuch as laborers will finally gain the upper hand and will do away with production of goods after the social (capitalistic) fashion. Again, in social relations, through the emancipation of woman. When woman, who belongs exclusively in the home and the family, acquires also social independence, and marriage is reduced to a contract, the ground will be entirely removed from beneath human "community" life, for, says Tönnies, "the radical quality of the race and of the family is vegetative life in the sociological sense as the substantial basis of human coexistence in general" (p. 247). With the fall of society "civilization also collapses. The strife of classes is destroying society and the state which it intends to reform. Since the aggregate of culture is worked into social and civic civilization culture itself comes to an end in this its changed form" (p. 288).

What will come then? Who can tell? Tönnies can hear only the crashing of society. He construes the course of history, up to date at least, as a movement "from the primitive, simple, domestic communism and the involved and consequent *individualism* of the hamlet or village to the *independent individualism*, metropolitan or cosmopolitan in spirit, and the consequently posited state or international *socialism*. And here is the end of all!"

So much for the hopeless theory which Tönnies has set down in a book that at all events must be reckoned among the most profound and suggestive of all times. The undertone of this book is profound despair over the inevitable social fall. The whole reads like the last will and testament of society—and of the author! No issue can of course be made with the author's personal view point. Another more optimistic thinker is equally entitled to a contrasted point of view. One may see in the agitations of our time the signs of a new renaissance more splendid



than anything before, and one may claim that this prospect is assured by the fact that acquired science and broadened æsthetic perspective afford an unprecedented basis for an improved social condition. This view in turn could maintain itself against all criticism.

But when we come to objective scientific truth, criticism must challenge many fundamental principles of Tönnies' theory. In the first place there is no such sharp discrepancy between "society" and "community" as Tönnies alleges. When the circumference of the community widens, there still remains within it room for closer and smaller circles. In fact in our society the most intimate bonds of blood relationship, of neighborhood, and of friendship, have by no means ceased to be. Consequently the "essential will" remains and works parallel with "arbitrariness." Again Tönnies regards trade (*Tauschverkehr*) as the central activity of society, and indeed as its "root." But trade is, in idea and essence, only a function, not even an essential trait, least of all the "root" of society.

What Tönnies entirely overlooks, and Bücher rightly emphasizes, is the principle of nationality. There is a temptation to adapt Tönnies' terminology to the service of this principle. A national state is a "community." It cannot be denied that nationality in today's form, and in its historical efficiency, in spite of all crossings and comminglings of races, includes almost all the qualities which Tönnies predicates of a "community." Moreover in society, even of the loosest sort as it appeared to Tönnies, there is an undeniable interworking of the members upon each other. The mere fact that individuals are together has, as a consequence, a reciprocity of influence among them. It cannot, therefore, be seriously contended that in society individuals are independent of each other. Simmel indeed has contended<sup>1</sup> that reciprocal influence (*Wechselwirkung*) is the sole discoverable mark of the concept society. "There is no such thing," says Simmel, "as a societary entity, from the unitary character of

<sup>1</sup> *Ueber soziale Differenzierung*. Sociologische und psychologische Untersuchungen. Leipzig, 1890.

which new qualities, and conditions, and arrangements of the parts may be derived. There are rather relations and activities of the elements on the ground of which alone unity may be predicated." In this sense it may be said that society is only a name for a function. The function is reciprocal influence, which, to be sure, may be more or less close, so that, according to Simmel, there is "more and less" of society.

In opposition to Staummler also, has Simmel rightly emphasized the importance of this reciprocity. Staummler defines society as "an externally regulated coexistence of human beings" (*loc. cit.*, p. 90). Simmel on the contrary contends that external regulation is only a secondary *sine qua non* derived from reciprocity, without which the regulation could not come into being.

It may be replied to Tönnies further that reciprocal influence must exist in order that an exchange may take place. Exchange is, as even Tönnies psychologically interprets it, "a resultant of two divergent components." In order that a resultant may arise, it is a mechanical necessity that the components shall have an effect not alone on a common point of contact but upon each other. In our case, volitions, psychical forces, are the components. Accordingly in every case of exchange there is concerned in fact a more or less intensive psychical reciprocity between the parties. The "root" of society, therefore, is not the derived exchange, but the reciprocity which is the foundation and source of all intercourse.

From the standpoint of reciprocity Simmel undertakes to elucidate the relation of the individual to the group and of groups to each other. The question is essentially as to the relation between differentiation and socialization. The well-known dictum of Spencer that differentiation and integration are in direct proportion to each other, finds here complete justification and splendid illumination. So profound and comprehensive, and yet so compact is the treatment, that it is impossible to render a brief account of the argument. One or two points of view, which seem to me fundamental, may be indicated.

The first symptom of the undifferentiated condition of groups is *collective responsibility*. This lack of differentiation is both subjective on the part of the one observing and judging, and objective on the part of the group judged. Conversely collective responsibility is a powerful hindrance to differentiation, since inasmuch as the group is identified with each of its members it is compelled to show a compact front against a third party in order to maintain its defense. This necessity of compactness is the first and strongest occasion for integration.

When through a long process of differentiation the group has arrived at a certain height of development, there appears the astonishing tendency to revert toward collective responsibility. Thus men are today trying to throw the blame for individual faults upon society. But the sociological conception of the individual as "the point of intersection of countless social threads," while in part relieving the individual of responsibility, on the whole places more responsibilities upon him than would be possible with the atomistic conception.

Simmel credits the "extension of the group" with a high degree of individualizing force. Differentiation within a group proceeds in two ways: by the differentiation of the individual members within the group, and by attachment of the whole group to a larger social circle. From such attachment there results not only a severance of many bonds of union with the narrower group, but innumerable possibilities are opened for new relationships—*i. e.*, for differentiation.

In the chapter on The Social Level Simmel declares, in opposition to all previous explanations, that the psychological ground of all struggles for equality, the socialistic included, is endeavor after higher status, not for actual equality. It is in point of fact very characteristic that in such social struggles for equality the weapons are mostly used only against the class that is immediately above, not against the highest. It appears that this eminently socializing motive contains a vigorous individualizing element.

Particular mention should be made of the point of view that

differentiation is an effect of effort for conservation of energy. This thought, which is used in psychology as "the law of minimum effort," and in various ways in the natural sciences, should be made useful in sociology. Thus Simmel shows great skill in tracing the development of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and of military ranks from the principle of the conservation of energy.

In a word Simmel's method of sociological investigation is distinguished by profound psychological analysis and by historical illumination of problems, though relatively less by the latter than by the former. This is methodologically justified, since historical phenonema can have no value for sociology until they have been brought into the clear light of social and individual psychology.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Translated by ALBION W. SMALL.

(To be continued.)